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Both the Chang Myon civilian government that came to power after the student
revolution of April 1960 and the military government that supplanted it fol-
lowing the coup of May 1961 were basically reformist. On the domestic front, eca
the military government reformed the budget process, the taxation machinery,
w JC
andthe currency system. Just prior to the coup, the civilian government had
attempted to unify the exchange rate system and had devalued the won in cent
January 1961 from 65to100 won to the dollar and again in February from
100 to 130. The military government continued the pursuit of exchange rate
e
reform and achieved complete unification of the system by June 1961. Other
innovations included the institution in 1961 of a system of special tariffs to
D help soak up margins on restricted imports, a currency reform in 1961, and E
an easing of import restrictions in 1962.
. UN
The reforms of 196 1—62, however, were not successfully carried out. The
currency reform was largely a mistaken attempt to sterilize what were thought The
to be currency hoards. Each family was permitted to exchange old currency chan
for new up to a limited amount. The reform was expensive, caused massive exch
confusion and did not accomplish the stated objectives. The multiple exchange
rate was reinstituted in 1963 and import controls were strengthened. By 1963, reslqj
the exchange rate system had reverted to a Bhagwati-Krueger Phase II regime.
After the general election in early 1964, the nominally elected civilian
government instituted a substantial set of reforms in 1964 and 1965 that were
to be accompanied by a phenomenal economic performance. In May 1964,
0
thewon was devalued by almost 50 percent from 130 to 257 won to the dol- att
lar. This move was a prelude to the adoption of the unitary fluctuating ex-
. vaU
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change rate system that was introduced in March 1965. The exchange rate
gradually stabilized at about 270 won per dollar in August the same year that
the Exchange Bank intervened in the market. Quantitative restrictions were
also eased. Between late 1964 and early 1965, importable items were in-
creased from about 500 to 1,500 and the number of prohibited items was
reduced. Special tariffs were raised to help soak up margins on restricted im-
ports and import predeposit requirements were strengthened.
A second major effort was devoted to interest rate reform. In September
1965, the ceiling on commercial bank lending rates was raised from 16 to 26
percent with the result that the domestic supply of loanable funds available
through the banking system increased rapidly, and additional investment de-
mand spilled over into demand for foreign loans. This led to a great increase
in private capital imports.
A third element of the liberalization package was an effective stabiliza-
tion program. Collection of direct taxes was improved, rates were adjusted
upward, and expansion of the money supply was strictly limited. Beginning
in 1964, the government eliminated all deficits from the general budget and
constrained itself to limited, sporadic short-term borrowing.
A fourth element of the reform was an intensification of the degree and
..flt number of subsidization programs for exports. Subsidized credit for exports
became particularly attractive in contrast to the new and higher interest rates
which had been raised by the interest rate reform.
By 1966, South Korea had moved from Phase 111 into Phase IV. The
in continuation of this new phase is discussed in the next chapter. In this chapter
we discuss in detail the foreign exchange and trade policies that accompanied
ite the two liberalization episodes (196 1—62, 1964—65) and their consequences.
ter
DEVALUATION AND EXCHANGE RATE
UNIFICATION
he
ht The Chang Myon government attempted to unify the exchange rate in 1961 by
changing the foreign exchange deposit system, in use since 1950, to the foreign
ye exchange buying system in which all foreign exchange earnings were sold to
the central bank at the official exchange rate. Foreign exchange deposits by
3 residents were not authorized except for international airlines and shipping
e. companies. Those who surrendered foreign exchange earnings to the central
in bank were given nontransferable exchange certificates valid for 90 days. (Al-
•re though not legally transferable, the certificates were sold on the curb market.)
• 4 Holders of exchange certificates were entitled to buy from the central bank
at the official rate an amount of foreign exchange equal to the certificates'
value. Concomitant with the unification of rates, the official exchange ratea
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was raised twice—from 65 won to the dollar to 100 won on January 1, 1961
and to 130 won on February 2, 1961.
Although exchange rate reform of 1961 made the multiple exchange rate
system illegal, multiple rates remained in use for a while afterward through
sales of certificates on the curb market. The fixed single official exchange rate
of 130 won to the dollar was only slightly higher than the most frequently
quoted rates on United States aid and KFX import dollars in late 1960 and F1
was lower than the market exchange rate on export dollars. As Table 3—1 re- Se
veals, the free market rates on Japan and other export dollars were 156.3 won Fi
and 141.6 won to the dollar in January 1961. Beginning in February 1961, Se
the export dollar certificates were traded on the curb market at declining rates Fi
but at rates higher than the official exchange rate. The free market for export
dollar certificates ceased to function after June as a result of intensified con-
trol by the military government followed by the abolition of the certificate sys- F1
tem on July 20, 1961.
Firt
CHANGES IN TRADE POLICY, 1961 TO 1963
With the adoption of a unitary fixed exchange rate in June 1961, the differen- fiJ tial between the import price and the domestic price became greater for some
items restricted by import quota. Thus in July 1961, a Temporary Special
Customs Law was enacted to capture the windfall profits that would otherwise
accrue to importers receiving import licenses for restricted items. Under the C
law, about 700 items subject to import quotas were classified into four cate-
gories, I to IV, in order based on the ratio between the domestic price and the
c.i.f. import price and the estimated degree of nonessentiality. A temporary
special tariff was imposed on these classified import items in addition to regu-
lar tariffs. The special rates were 100 percent of import value on category I, ti1
50 percent on category II, 30 percent on category III, and 10 percent on
category IV. Adjustments were made periodically in the classification of MI
items.
Import controls were revised twice in 196!. In the first half of 1961, the
commodities proposed for import were listed in four classes: (1) automatic
approval (AA) items that could be financed by any foreign exchange source
without prior approval of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; (2) AA
special items that could be financed only by export earnings without prior pri
approval of the Ministry; (3) restricted import items linked to specific corn-
modity exports that required approval for imports; and (4) prohibited im- stir
ports. The total number of importable items listed was 1,581, including 35
restricted items as shown in Table 4—1. Commodities not listed could not be






First half 1961 1,546a 35b 1,581 305
Second half 1961 1,015 17 — 1,132 355
Firsthalf 1962 1,195 119 — 1,314 366
Secondhalf 1962 1,377 121 — 1,498 433
Firsthalf 1963 776 713 — 1,489 442
Secondhalf 1963 109 924 — 1,033 414
Firsthalf 1964 na na na 1,124 617
Second half 1964 na na na 496 631
First half 1965 1,447 92 19 1,558 624
Secondhalf 1965 1,495 124 4 1,623 620
Firsthalf 1966 2,104 125 11 2,240 583
Second half 1966 2,307 127 12 2,446 386
Firsthalf 1967 2,950 132 — 3,082 362
NOTE: The numbers of importable and prohibited items for 1961 to 1963 and the
first half of 1967 were based on the original semiannual trade programs while breakdowns
for all other periods are based on final revised programs..
SouRcE: Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Review, June and December, 1961 to
1963; Bank of Korea, Review a/the Korean Economy, 1964 to 1966; and Ministry of
Commerce and Industry, A Ten-Year History of Trade and Industrial Policy, 1960—7969.
a. Includes 309 special items that could be imported only by export earnings.
b. Indicates import items linked to specific exports.
In the trade program for the second half of 1961, prepared for the first
time by the military government, commodities were grouped in three cate-
gories: (1) AA items that could be imported without prior approval of the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry; (2) restricted items that could be im-
ported with official approval; and (3) prohibited items. The total number of
importable items (restricted and AA items) was significantly reduced in the
second half of 1961 compared with the first half, while the number of pro-
hibited items increased.
In order to promote procurement from the United States, the trade
program for the second half of 1961 differentiated aid-financed imports from
KFX (foreign exchange held by the Bank of Korea) imports. The program
stipulated that AID commodities could not be imported with KFX but only
with AID funds. The differentiation continued, in principle, until 1970.
Throughout 1962, both the number of AA items and the total number
of importable items were increased over the quotas of late 1961. In the first
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961 TABLE 4-1
Number of Importable Items in Semiannual Trade Programs,
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half of 1963, however, the number of AA items was sharply reduced, while chaji
the number of restricted items was increased. These stronger restrictions re- banl
flected the sharp decline in KFX holdings that year. on U
The Law Prohibiting Sales of Special Foreign Products, enacted by the
military government in 1961, was represented as an attempt to restrict the
import or smuggling of luxuries. The law banned domestic sales of a number RE
of foreign items such as foreign-made cigarettes, coffee, cosmetics, and high- 19
quality cloth.
Various efforts were made to increase export incentives during this pe- In 1
nod. A new system of subsidies, adopted in September 1961, classified export fisc
commodities into four categories for payment of subsidies; 25 won per dollar flO
for special category exports (new commodity exports and net exports by Ups
bonded processing), 20 won for Category I, 15 won for Category II, and ings
10 won for Category III. Subsidy payments in 1961 totaled approximately inSti
307 million won. In 1962 the number of exports supported by subsidies was righ
expanded, and total payments reached 566 million won. Though the next restql
year a higher rate was paid on manufactured exports, other rates were cut,
and the list of items eligible for subsidy was shortened. The net result was a elimj
reduction in total subsidies paid to 354 million won. As a percent of the value red
of exports at the official exchange rate, subsidies came to about 6 percent in
196 1, 8 percent in 1962, and 3 percent in 1963. of
The preferential interest rate on export credits was gradually reduced and
from 13.87 percent per annum in 1960 to 8 percent in 1963, thus increasing im
the implicit export subsidy. This rate was well below the commercial bank of t
loan rate of 16 to 17.5 percent. tic
Tax relief for exporters was instituted in 1961 by removing the domestic ual
commodity tax from exports and by exempting exporters from the business Th
activity tax. Income tax incentives included a 30 percent reduction of tax on Spe
income from exports and a 20 percent reduction on income from sales of acq
goods and services to the United Nations Command and tourist services. The aid
tax reductions on income from exports and other foreign exchange earning
activities were raised to a uniform rate of 50 percent effective January 1, 1962.
Another facet of the military government's export strategy was the insti-
tution of full-scale export targets in 1962. Before the beginning of each year, EX
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was to set the new year's targets on
the basis of past export performance and new export forecasts for separate Thq:
commodities. Annual export targets were usually classified by commodity,
region, and country of destination. Commodity targets were assigned to indus-
trial associations and firms, and the regional and country targets to South
Korean trade and diplomatic missions abroad. The Ministry maintained an abo!
"export situation room" to check actual performance during the year against
the annual targets. In addition, an Expanded Export Conference, which was tion
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chaired by the President and attended by ministers, government officials,
bankers, and exporters, usually met several times during the year to deliberate
on the annual targets.
RETURN TO MULTIPLE EXCHANGE RATES,
1963
In 1961 and early 1962, the military government followed very expansionary
rt fiscal and monetary policies which led to inflation in 1962 and 1963. The eco-
tar nomic situation was exacerbated by a bad harvest in 1962 and a consequent
b upsurge in imports of grain. The resulting decline in foreign exchange hold-
ings brought a return to a multiple exchange rate system in 1963 through the
institution of a full-scale export-import link and the emergence of an import-
rights premium market. The trade program for imports was made much more
restrictive in the first half of 1963 when automatic approval items were cut 50
Ut
percent.In the second half of 1963 automatic approval items were nearly
eliminated, restricted items increased eightfold, and total importable items
ue reduced by almost one-third (Table 4—1).
in Under the link system, exporters were given the right to use 100 percent
of their export earnings for imports. In early 1963, raw materials for exports
ed and for five-year plan projects, as well as scrap iron and cement, could be
ng imported without import entitlement obtained through export. Once the import
nk of these items increased sharply, however, the government removed all excep-
tions on July 31, 1963. The free market premium rate on import rights grad-
tic ually rose from 32 won per dollar in January 1963 to 65 won in April 1964.
The rise in this premium prompted the government to enact the Temporary
Dfl SpecialExcess Profits Tax Law to levy 50 won per dollar on sales of dollars
acquired by the government through U.S. supporting assistance and PL 480
he aid after December 1963. The effective exchange rates on both exports and
imports became, therefore, much higher than the official exchange rate.
2.
ti—
EXCHANGE RATE REFORM, 1964 TO 1965
Lte The exchange rate reform, announced on May 3, 1964, began with a large
devaluation from 130 won to 257 won. For a while thereafter, foreign ex-
change certificates (which were earned by exports and carried an import en-
.th titlement) continued to sell at a premium above the official exchange rate of
an about 255 won to the dollar.
1st On March 22, 1965, the government announced the actual implementa-
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fident that the rate would not fluctuate widely since relative price stability had itei
been attained by the second half of 1964. As an extra precaution, standby Tb
credits of $9.3 million were made available by the IMF for a foreign exchange ma
stabilization fund. The unitary fluctuating exchange rate system worked in the de
following way:
(1) Residents who earned foreign exchange by exports or sales to the La
United Nations Command were required to surrender their exchange earnings
for exchange certificates which were valid for a month from date of issue, the
They could be freely traded on the exchange market, but on expiration they I a
had to be sold to exchange banks for won currency. wh
(2) Those who required foreign exchange had to present foreign ex- reg
change certificates when import licenses were issued by the Bank of Korea. rat
(3) The official exchange rate was announced every day by the Bank
of Korea on the basis of exchange certificate prices quoted in the free exchange Fii
market.
(4) The foreign departments of commercial banks were authorized to
act as brokers for transactions of certificates. Th
(5) The Bank of Korea had authority to intervene in the certificate
market when the market price of certificates fluctuated sharply owing to
seasonal or speculative factors.
Immediately after the announcement of the new 'foreign exchange rate in-
system, the first market exchange rate on certificates was formed at 270 won all
to the dollar. The exchange rate on certificates, however, declined gradually ec1
to 256 won to the dollar at the end of April 1965. The rate began to rise again
in May, and by the end of the month the market exchange rate was quoted at
280 won per dollar. II
On June 22, 1965, the Bank of Korea first intervened in the market by
increasing the supply of exchange certificates. In the beginning, intervention Al
could not completely remove fluctuations in the market exchange rate since
the Bank supplied only a limited amount of additional certificates from KFX
holdings. But from August 22, 1965 through 1967, the exchange rate was it-ri
completely pegged at around 271 won to the dollar by sales of certificates by
the Bank. P4
di.
LIBERALIZATION OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS,
1964 TO 1966
After the May 1964 devaluation, the balance of payments situation improved e
markedly and trade restrictions were gradually liberalized. As shown in Table lo
4—i, between the last half of 1964 and the first half of 1965, the number ofINTENSIFICATION OF EXPORT INCENTIVES
had items eligible for importation increased substantially from about 500 to 1,500.
dby Thereafter, the list continued to increase rapidly as did the number of auto-
nge matic approval items. The number of prohibited items showed a marked
the decline from the second half of 1965 to the first half of 1967.
Also after the May 1964 devaluation, a new Temporary Special Tariff
Law was enacted to soak up margins between c.i.f. import prices and domestic
the prices of restricted import items. About 2,200 import commodities, for which
tngs the "foreign exchange ratio"1 exceeded 30 percent, were classified in categories
sue. I and II. The special tariff was imposed on the difference between the domestic
they wholesale price of an imported good and the landed price of that import plus
regular tariff, commodity tax, incidental expenses, and normal profit. A tariff
ex- rate of 90 percent was applied to category I and 70 percent to category II.
To administer the special tariff, the Bank of Korea and the Ministry of
ank Finance made a monthly survey of domestic wholesale prices of import corn-
tnge modities. On the basis of this price survey, the list of items for the special
• tariff was expanded from about 2,200 in 1964 to about 2,700 after 1965. i to Those items to which a regular tariff did not apply were, however, exempted
from the special tariff.
cate In 1964 an import prepayment deposit requirement was introduced. The
to requirement was revised from 100 to 255 won per dollar, or to 100 percent
of import value, with the exchange rate change in 1964. After March 1965 the
rate import prepayment deposit system was transformed into a system under which
won all commercial importers were required to deposit foreign exchange certificates
tally equivalent to the value of imports at the time of the opening of the L/C.
gain
dat
INTENSIFICATION OF EXPORT INCENTIVES
by
tion Along with the exchange reform and import liberalization, the period 1964—66
ince saw marked intensification of export incentives (Table 3—3). Direct export
•FX subsidies were abolished in 1964, but other incentives grew in number and
was importance. Particular emphasis was placed on an expansion of credit incen-
by tives. The preferential rate on export credits was reduced from 8 percent in
1963 to 6.5 percent in February 1965, and to 6.0 percent in June 1967, fur-
[her increasing the implicit export subsidy. The Bank of Korea lowered the
discount rate on export bills from 4.5 percent to 3.5 percent in 1966. This
rediscount of bills was enormously profitable for commercial banks which
financed nearly all export credits through rediscounting bills.
In 1964, the number of types and the volume of preferential loans for
ved export increased substantially. In addition to export credits and operating
able loans from counterpart funds, the following preferential loan arrangements
r of existed:r
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(1) loans for suppliers of U.S. offshore procurement (mainly for Viet
Nam); in
(2) credits for importers of raw materials and equipment for export dii
industries; Jo
(3) export usance (credits to exporters who ship without L/Cs but of
receive payment after shipment); sy
(4) export industry promotion loans; g
(5)MediumIndustry Bank equipment loans for conversion of factories cc
to export production; and in
(6) Medium Industry Bank equipment loans for specialized export pr
industries. in
ex
In addition to the preferential loans listed in Table 4—2, a standby credit
system was instituted in 1965 for supporting the overseas marketing activities T
of export firms. The standby credit, which was a type of L/C for service gi
transactions, could be opened by the Bank of Korea for (1) guaranteeing the
opening of an export L/C by an overseas branch to its domestic head firm and fort
the settlement of the export L/C, (2) guarantee money for international bid- fa
ding and contracts, and (3) other financial guarantees for foreign exchange m
earning activities of overseas branches. The domestic firms were required to th
submit foreign exchange certificates or a foreign exchange payment guarantee giv
issued by a foreign exchange bank for opening the standby credit. im
In 1964, government support for foreign market development was gradu- cx
ally intensified. The Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) was
founded and quickly expanded its overseas branch network to increase the sp
sales of Korean products in foreign markets. In addition, the government sent
special trade missions to many foreign countries and concluded trade agree-
ments with a number of them from 1964 to 1966, including India, Burma, E
Cambodia, Italy, Austria, West Germany, Japan, and Mexico. The govern-
ment also authorized the Korean Trader's Association to collect 1 percent of
the value of all c.i.f. imports fràm importers for use in export promotion. atl In 1965, the long-established practice of giving preference to exporters bad
in the granting of import licenses was expanded and formalized. Exporters
were given automatic right to import raw materials duty free up to certain
limits. The limits established for each export commodity were based on a
technically determined ratio of required raw materials to output plus an addi-
tional factor called a wastage allowance. The wastage allowance is administra-
tively determined and is varied from time to time. Since it applies to raw per
materials which are generally limited by import controls or subject to high
duties, the markups between import price and domestic price are quite large. ON
That portion of the wastage allowance not used in production could be sold
locally (since, unlike in other countries, these imports could be sold legally),
sometimes at great profit to export industries, per
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jet In order to increase the domestic value-added content of exports, export
incentives were extended to producers of intermediate goods used in the pro-
)rt duction of exports through a system of local letters of credit (L/Cs). The
local L/C system came into effect in the second quarter of 1965 as the result
tut of a revision of the Foreign Exchange Control Regulation. The local L/C
system enabled exporters to issue local L/Cs to domestic producers of export
goods and intermediates for export products on the basis of export L/Cs re-
ceived by the exporters. The local L/Cs issued by exporters could be settled
in foreign exchange certificates when export shipment was made. Domestic
Drt producers with local L/Cs could get the same treatment as exporters in obtain-
ing preferential bank loans, import licenses for necessary raw materials, and
exemption from import duties and the business activity tax.
dit In the latter part of 1966, an export-import link system was reintroduced.
The main purpose of the system was to increase exports with low profit mar-
ice gins and to develop new export markets by linking export performance with
•:he the import rights either for popular consumer items or for imports of inputs
nd for exported commodities. For instance, the exporters of woolen yarn and
fabrics, sweaters, and clothing were given the rights to import raw wool and
ige mohair at a rate of 25.5 to 85 percent of their export earnings (depending on
to the export commodity). Exporters of radios and electronic products were
tee given the import rights to television accessories, exporters of chinaware the
import rights to porcelain, exporters of domestically assembled watches and
lu- exporters to Switzerland the import rights to Swiss watches.
'as Finally, an additional tax incentive granted to exporters in 1966 was a
'he special method of accelerated depreciation.
• EFFECTS OF THE LIBERALIZATION EFFORTS
The attempt to unify exchange rates in 1961 and to effect other reforms failed
0
becausethe policies of the newly established military government, which were
rs
at first inflationary, became more restrictive and complex as a result of a very
bad harvest in 1962. The reforms of 1964—65 were accompanied by very suc-
cessful economic performance across the board. Consider the exceptional
'a nature of the changes that took place between 1964 and 1966:
(1) an average annual growth rate of real GNP of 9.6 percent;
a- (2) a decline in the rate of inflation from 35 percent in 1964 to 10
IW percentin 1965 and 9 percent in 1966 (wholesale price index);
(3) the ratio of domestic saving increased from 5.7 to 11.7 percent of
;e. GNP;
(4) exports increased by more than 40 percent per year;
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(6) bank time and savings deposits increased about 4 times in 1965 evi
constant prices; and de
(7) government revenue increased from 7.3 percent of ON? to 10.8
percent. att
It would be a mistake to attribute all of these achievements directly to
liberalization. Industrial growth was actually very rapid in 1962 and 1963,
before the successful liberalization began. In 1964, in fact, growth of manu- N
facturing and mining slowed to 6.9 percent, down from 15.7 percent the year
before. Social overheads and services grew at 3.0 percent in 1964 compared
with 7.4 percent in 1963 and 8.9 percent in 1962. GNP growth in 1964 was (red
a healthy 8.3 percent, only because of a particularly good harvest; value added
in agriculture grew by 15.5 percent.
e
Theliberalization episode was impressive because it was accompanied by
such a rapid decline in the rate of inflation. The May 1964 devaluation of
about 50 percent (from 130 won to 257 won to the dollar) was not inflation-
ary largely because of the monetary and fiscal stabilization program. Another
fact is important here also: the devaluation was more de jure than de facto, at
least with respect to exports. The multiple exchange rate system and the van-
ous taxes and subsidies on exports resulted in an effective exchange rate for
exports which was little changed after the 1964—65 devaluation. Consolidation
of exchange rates since the 1964—65 liberalization eliminated the multiple
exchange rate premia and was accompanied by suspension of payments of
direct export subsidies (for statistical details, see the next chapter). Since the
devaluation was not really de facto, there was relatively little upward pressure
on prices of export goods.
The sharp rise in the bank deposit rate in 1965 also helped to curb infla-
tionary pressures. The great rise in savings and bank deposits substantially
reduced the velocity of circulation of the money supply.
The rapid growth of exports certainly cannot be attributed entirely to
liberalization, since the trend dates from 1959. In 1960 exports increased from
$20 to $33 million and have not ceased to grow to the present time. Various
export incentives were intensified and the effective exchange rate on exports
increased by about 11 percent, but this did not spur a noticeable increase in
the rate of growth of exports. The most that can be said is that liberalization
probably laid the groundwork for continued rapid growth of exports over the
following decade and that without those efforts, such phenomenally rapid ex-
port growth could not have continued. Likewise, the exchange liberalization,
the interest rate reform, and the fiscal reforms probably laid the basis for a
• decade of rapid growth in GNP which would not have been possible otherwise.
These hypotheses are reexamined at the end of this book after a discus-
sian of other statistical evidence. Unfortunately, no clear answers emerge; the
a • • - - -
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5 evidenceis more suggestive than definitive. Nevertheless, much of the evi-
dence, however imperfect, seems to indicate that the trade and exchange rate
8 policies of the Korean government throughout the decade following the first
attempts at liberalization, rather than the liberalization package by itself, were




1. Foreign exchange ratio =(domesticwholesale price of imported goods) minus
(regular tariff + commodity tax + normal expenses) divided by (normal foreign ex-
as change price of the import on c.i.f basis). This formula was basically an estimate of the
premium which could be obtained by an importer licensed to import a restricted item.
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